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RESPONSE

COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY FOR AND BY WHOM?

RYAN CALO†
In response to Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy
Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373 (2014).
INTRODUCTION
Professor Orin Kerr has proposed an elegant new thought experiment in
his piece, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act.1 The Article
efficiently relays the history and structure of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),2 a law that “grants Internet users a set of
statutory privacy rights that limits the government’s power to access a
person’s communications and records.”3 The Article then ably diagnoses
what is wrong with ECPA today—namely, that changes in technology and
constitutional law over the last quarter century have rendered ECPA
outdated.4 Finally, the Article proposes four plausible principles to guide
Congress were it to write a new electronic communications privacy statute

† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law; Faculty Director, Tech
Policy Lab, University of Washington; and Affiliate Scholar, Stanford Law School Center for
Internet and Society. Thank you to Susan Freiwald, Jennifer Granick, and Peter Winn for their
thoughts, and to the Gallagher Law Library at the University of Washington for helpful research
assistance.
1 Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373 (2014).
2 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.).
3 Kerr, supra note 1, at 375, 378-90.
4 Id. at 376-77, 390-410.
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from scratch, rather than reform ECPA at the margins, as contemporary
advocates propose.5
Professor Kerr’s argument is clear, forceful, and fundamentally sound in
the sense that his conclusion follows from his premises.6 The Article also makes
a series of quiet assumptions, however, that readers may find controversial.
First, the Article reads as though ECPA exists only to protect citizens
from public officials. According to its text and to case law, however, ECPA
also protects private citizens from one another in ways any new act should
revisit.7 Second, the Article assumes that society should address communications privacy with a statute, whereas specific experiences with ECPA
suggest that the courts may be better suited to address communications
privacy—for reasons Professor Kerr himself offers.8 Finally, the Article
addresses ECPA in isolation from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (FISA),9 which seems strange in light of revelations that our
government systematically intercepts and stores its citizens’ electronic
communications under FISA’s auspices.10
Put another way, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act succeeds
marvelously on its own terms, but not necessarily on everyone else’s. Worse
still, we do not benefit from Professor Kerr’s powerful insights regarding
the issues he omits.
I. WHY THE STATE?
The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act proceeds throughout as
though ECPA’s exclusive purpose is to protect citizens from public officials.11
5
6

Id. at 377-78, 411-18.
There is room to quibble here and there. A person with a greater taste for privacy might
argue that some “noncontent” information (e.g., that a person traveled to or called an abortion
clinic) should be protected to the same degree as “content” (e.g., what that person says to the
clinic). But see id. at 398-401 (distinguishing treatment of “noncontent metadata” from “the
contents of communications”). A technologist might contend that improvements to search
algorithms were just as relevant as cheaper storage in creating contemporary surveillance
capabilities. More practically minded readers might find “major principles,” id. at 378, less useful
than model language or specific details of a proposal—where devils sometimes live. The focus of
this Response is elsewhere.
7 See infra Part I.
8 See infra Part II.
9 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2006)).
10 See infra Part III.
11 E.g., Kerr, supra note 1, at 375, 380, 383-84, 387, 394, 402, 408 (focusing on how ECPA
“limits the government’s power to access a person’s communications and records” (emphasis
added)). But see infra note 15.
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One could easily read the entire Article without realizing that ECPA also
protects citizens from one another. Yet ECPA by its text disallows any
unauthorized party—not just government officials—from intercepting or
accessing private electronic communications.12 Indeed, a number of prominent ECPA cases involve surveillance activity by nongovernmental private
parties, such as employers, litigants, and web-monitoring companies.13
Professor Kerr’s omission matters for a few reasons. First, where solely
private actors are concerned, changes in how courts interpret the Fourth
Amendment neither furnish a reason to revisit ECPA14 nor create a constitutional floor for privacy violations should ECPA prove inadequate.15
Second, the “plummeting costs of storage”16 present as many questions in
private surveillance as in public surveillance. Does it still make sense, for
example, for the Stored Communications Act17 to allow Internet companies
voluntarily to disclose any amount of noncontent information to nongovernmental entities?18 Similarly, what is consent to “intercept” in a world

12 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012) (placing prohibitions on “any person,” rather than on government entities or officials); id. § 2701 (authorizing punishment for “whoever” unlawfully accesses
stored communications).
13 E.g., Theofel v. Farey–Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072-77 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding an ECPA
violation in private litigants’ use of an unlawful subpoena); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
352 F.3d 107, 113-15 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying ECPA to an employment dispute in which the
employee asserted that his employer improperly accessed his email account); In re Pharmatrak,
Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that a web-monitoring company “intercepted”
personal information and thus violated ECPA’s prohibitions); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
302 F.3d 868, 874-80 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying ECPA to an employment dispute in which an
employee sued his employer and alleged that the employer accessed the employee’s website under
false pretenses). For another example, just last year, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit alleging
that Google’s practice of scanning emails in furtherance of its advertising purposes violates ECPA.
See Plaintiff ’s Consolidated Individual & Class Action Complaint at 1-5, In re Google Inc. Gmail
Litig., No. 13-2430 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2013), 2013 WL 5823090.
14 Contra Kerr, supra note 1, at 376-77 (suggesting that where “new principles of [Fourth
Amendment] constitutional law have emerged,” ECPA’s coverage must also change); id. at 399401 (“[R]ecent Fourth Amendment rulings suggest that the focus of the statute can turn more to
noncontent information . . . that remain[s] outside the Fourth Amendment.”).
15 Professor Kerr acknowledges in passing that “[s]tatutory protections are still needed to
regulate nongovernmental access to contents of communications that the Fourth Amendment will
not reach,” yet comments on neither what the protections should be, nor whether the next
generation of ECPA is the right place for them. Id. at 400.
16 Id. at 376.
17 ECPA, tit. 11, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2012).
18 See generally id. § 2702(c)(6) (allowing electronic communications providers to divulge
their subscribers’ records to “any person other than a governmental entity”).
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where consumers may click through a dozen terms of service in a day?19
Were Congress to accept Professor Kerr’s invitation to rewrite ECPA, it
would receive little guidance about how to address these and related issues
of private access.
II. WHY A STATUTE?
The premise of The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act is that
decreases in digital storage costs, coupled with new clarity regarding how
the Fourth Amendment applies to electronic communications, suggest the
need to revisit the 1986 statute. Rather than tinker at the margins, as others
have suggested,20 Professor Kerr would rewrite the law from scratch.
I admire Professor Kerr’s “blue sky” approach, but it does beg a question:
If we are starting over anyway, why not use a different approach entirely—
such as a better interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?
In other work, Professor Kerr expressly defends the use of statutes over
constitutional interpretation to address information privacy concerns.21 His
preference for writing another ECPA makes sense in this light. Professor
Kerr’s views generated debate at the time,22 and I acknowledge a certain
futility in fighting the same battles anew.23 Yet our experiences with ECPA
represent particularly persuasive examples of why courts may be better
positioned than legislatures to address information privacy—for exactly the

19 See generally Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1882-92 (2013) (exploring the challenges consumers face when making
important privacy choices).
20 For example, Professor Kerr refers to the Digital Due Process Coalition. See Kerr, supra note 1,
at 386-89 (discussing the Coalition’s proposals). The Coalition is a group of advocates, scholars, and
industry members urging Congress to amend ECPA in specific ways. See Who We Are, DIGITAL
DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=DF652CE0-2552-11DF-B455000
C296BA163 (last visited Apr. 20, 2014) (announcing the Coalition’s goal “[t]o simplify, clarify, and
unify the ECPA standards,” and listing Coalition members such as Susan Freiwald). But see Susan
Freiwald & Sylvain Métille, Reforming Surveillance Law: The Swiss Model, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1261, 1330-31 (2013) (advocating a wholesale rewrite of ECPA based on a Swiss model).
21 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 838 (2004) (“Additional privacy protections are needed
to fill the gap between the protections that a reasonable person might want and what the Fourth
Amendment actually provides. . . . Congress will likely remain the primary source of privacy
protections in new technologies thanks to institutional advantages of legislatures.”).
22 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call
for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 760-77 (2005) (arguing against “pushing the
courts aside”).
23 Although, as Margaret Thatcher is supposed to have said, you may have to fight a battle
more than once to win it.
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reasons that Professor Kerr himself develops in suggesting the need for
ECPA reform.
Professor Kerr’s original argument holds that legislatures have several
institutional advantages over courts when regulating information privacy.
For instance, legislatures tend to understand technology better than
courts.24 But is this true in the ECPA context? Congress may have understood
a snapshot of the technology it was regulating in 1986, but it obviously
failed to appreciate the technology’s trajectory. Part of understanding
technology is appreciating which of its aspects will change as bandwidths or
business models evolve.
Legislatures are supposedly better able to keep pace with technological
change as well.25 Yet in the quarter century since it passed ECPA, Congress
has never meaningfully updated the statute to reflect an observable sea
change.26 Meanwhile, Professor Kerr openly admits that “[i]n the last
five years, courts have begun to settle the basic parameters of how the
Fourth Amendment applies to the Internet,”27 and “Fourth Amendment
protections are becoming established in ways that may soon outpace
statutory standards.”28
In other words, Professor Kerr paints a vivid picture of how the courts
came to outpace a stagnant statute, and then argues for a new statute that
would perpetuate this dynamic. A more comprehensive approach would
examine how ECPA reform might halt the progress courts have made in
interpreting the Fourth Amendment—a prospect Professor Kerr acknowledges
without seeming to appreciate its import for his larger argument.29

24 See Kerr, supra note 21, at 858-60 (“Courts tend to be poorly suited to generate effective
rules regulating criminal investigations involving new technologies. In contrast, legislatures
possess a significant institutional advantage in this area over courts.”).
25 See id. at 871 (“To ensure that the law maintains its intended balance, it needs mechanisms
that can adapt to technological change. Legislatures are up to the task; courts generally are not.”).
26 ECPA has been updated about a dozen times since 1986. See generally, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701 note (2012) (Amendments) (listing multiple amendments to one ECPA section, passed as
recently as 2002). Yet it has never shed the fundamental dichotomies that, according to Professor
Kerr, suggest the need to rewrite the law from scratch. See generally Kerr, supra note 1, at 390-410
(discussing ECPA’s failure to address real-time storage, contemporary forms of Internet
communications, noncontent metadata, particularity requirements, and territorial scope).
27 Kerr, supra note 1, at 376.
28 Id. at 390.
29 Cf. id. at 401 (arguing merely that “[e]liminating content protections under ECPA may
paradoxically speed up the process of establishing the apparent strong constitutional protections”).
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III. WHITHER THE NSA?
For the sake of argument, let us assume that ECPA is, at its core, a statute
about protecting citizens from the government, and that statutes are the
best and most expedient means to do so. There remains the question of
whether determining what “electronic communications privacy laws ideally
look like”30 should occur in isolation from a more general inquiry into
American surveillance powers and practices.
The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act arrives at an interesting
time, amid a series of revelations confirming the extensive—some would say
frightening—surveillance activities of the National Security Agency (NSA).
According to lawsuits and the press, the NSA intercepts and stores for later
analysis literally every communication transmitted across major networks.31
Meanwhile, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also requests and
receives phone logs from millions of U.S. citizens under § 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001.32 If government officials can already collect and
analyze substantial proportions of citizens’ electronic communications without a
traditional warrant, some readers may wonder whether reforming ECPA is
like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
30
31

Id. at 375.
See generally P RIVACY & C IVIL L IBERTIES O VERSIGHT B D ., P UBLIC H EARING
R EGARDING THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE S URVEILLANCE ACT 123-24 (2014) (statement of Jameel Jaffer,
Deputy Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union), available at http://www.pclob.
gov/Library/Meetings-Events/2014-March-19-Public-Hearing/19-March-2014_ Public_Hearing_
Transcript.pdf (“Given the absence of any meaningful limitation on NSA’s authority to acquire
international communications under Section 702, it’s likely that NSA’s databases already include
the communications of millions of Americans.”); JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A
QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 22-27 (2014) (“After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government established sweeping,
possibly illegal dragnets that captured the phone call and e-mail traffic of nearly every American.”).
32 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–
1862 (2006)) (authorizing, for counterterrorism investigations and intelligence activities, FBI
applications for ex parte orders requiring the production of business records and tangible things).
Cf. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 21-56 (2014),
available at http://www.pclob.gov/All%20Documents/Report%20on%20the%20Telephone%20Records
%20Program/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf (“Under a program
authorized by the FISA court pursuant to Section 215, the NSA is permitted to obtain all call
records generated by certain telephone companies in the United States.”); ANGWIN, supra note 31,
at 27 (reporting that three days after the attacks of September 11, 2011, the NSA’s agency director
“approved warrantless interception of any U.S. phone call to or from specific terrorist-identified
phone numbers in Afghanistan” and later “expanded the order to cover all phone numbers in
Afghanistan”—actions that ultimately “mushroomed into a massive domestic dragnet”).
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Despite appearances, the two governmental contexts are analytically
distinct. The NSA is not the FBI; it is interested, as its name suggests, in
national security rather than routine law enforcement. Likewise, FISA is
limited to foreign intelligence—even if reporting also suggests that “foreign”
is defined somewhat loosely.33
The danger in taking a piecemeal approach to surveillance reform, however,
is that these two contexts bleed into one another in practice. Take the
phenomenon known as “mission creep.” Public understanding is incomplete, but it appears that intelligence agencies sometimes share information
gathered outside ECPA strictures with domestic law enforcement.34
A next generation communications privacy act could more explicitly
address today’s widely shared concerns over mass surveillance. While
offering guiding principles for reformers, we could ask them to draft a new
statute that acknowledges how citizens’ information can jump contexts and
that guards against such an eventuality.
CONCLUSION
The norms of legal scholarship invite authors to determine the scope of
their own argument. We are free to “bracket” issues and to set them to one
side in order to focus on another concern. At some point, however, an
author can leave out too much in pursuit of clarity. The Next Generation
Communications Privacy Act represents an elegant thought experiment, but at
the cost of assuming away some important aspects of communications
privacy. Worse yet, the reader cannot benefit from Professor Kerr’s keen
insights on the topics he omits. I nevertheless enjoyed the Article immensely,
recommend it to readers, and look forward to continued dialogue on this
important issue.

33 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES
( July 6, 2013), http://mobile.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-powersof-nsa.html (“FISA judges have ruled that the N.S.A.’s collection and examination of Americans’
communications data to track possible terrorists does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
34 See, e.g., John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, U.S. Directs Agents to Cover Up Program Used to
Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE
97409R20130805 (detailing a program whereby “[a] secretive U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
unit [funneled] information from intelligence wiretaps . . . to authorities across the nation to help
them launch criminal investigations of Americans”).
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